Finally, if Japan went to war, the military strategy in the Far East would be defensive. [3] Although the ABC-1 agreement was not a military alliance, it nevertheless meant that the United States was preparing to go to war on the side of the Allied powers, that the United States would do everything possible to maintain the security of the British Commonwealth, and that the U.S. military was modifying existing war plans (e.g. B.B, the RAINBOW plans). integrate military integration and cooperation with other nations. The report of the 1941 BRITISH-American General Staff Conference set out the general military principles, resources, and deployment strategies of a common Allied military strategy. The British approach to the Nazi problem differed from the original American plan. The British first called for a Sun Tsu approach to attack the flanks and periphery of Nazi interests (North Africa, Middle East, etc.). In contrast, following a Jomini-based approach, the United States sought a mass battle with Nazi Germany.[2] The plan assumed that if the United States went to war with Nazi Germany, it would likely go to war with Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan.
The general principles of the agreement stipulated: [3] The agreed offensive policy included the premature elimination of Italy as a partner of the Axis powers; the support of neutral states and clandestine groups in their resistance against the Axis powers; a sustained air offensive to destroy the military power of the Axis powers; an increase in forces for the subsequent offensive against Germany and, if necessary, the conquest of the territories from which this offensive is to be launched; and agree that the Atlantic and European areas are the “decisive arena” and will therefore be at the center of US military efforts, although the “great importance” of the Middle East and Africa has also been noted. This was the first American, British and Canadian military agreement (hence its name) concluded at the secret Washington conference between the high-ranking military staffs of the three countries (29 January/27 March 1941). The plan was initially adopted only on an informal basis, but ratified at the Arcadia Conference in Washington in December 1941. This led to the reinforcement of forces operating in the Atlantic by the US Navy and also to the deployment of the new British battleship Prince of Wales and the former battlecruiser Repulse in the waters of the Far East. This was in line with the consensus that the security of the British Commonwealth and Empire, including the maintenance of an Extreme Eastern position, should be maintained in all circumstances. The third cornerstone of the agreement between the three powers was that the security of maritime communications between the Allied powers was essential. The general principles of the agreement stated that the territorial interest of the United States lay in the Western Hemisphere; whereas the security of the United Kingdom, its Empire and the Commonwealth must be maintained in all circumstances, including the maintenance of an Extreme Eastern position; and that the security of maritime communications between the Allied Powers is essential. This agreement was generally consistent with the existing American “Rainbow-5” concept, already adopted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt was accepted, and subsequently embodied the concept of “Germany First” to characterize the allies` determination that if Nazi Germany declared war on the United States, Germany would be the main enemy, and therefore all major efforts would be devoted to defeating Germany before significant forces were forced to defeat. allocated to anything other than holding or attrition operations. against Japan.
The agreement stipulated that the first steps against Germany were to be a blockade, an airstrike and a subversion. Marshall hardly needed persuasion. Given the likely and imminent reality of a two-ocean war, he knew that the U.S. military was ill-equipped to defend the Philippines, a U.S. protectorate, and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii, not to mention the nation`s widely dispersed small Pacific island possessions. And the U.S. Navy, which had moved its Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, had its own problems preventing Roosevelt from distributing the fleet to other U.S. Pacific island regions. .
His delegation generally agreed with the first two points. But putting American life at risk to defend a remote British colony away from American property? The Americans closed ranks by rejecting the third. The British delegation retaliated – harshly. They claimed that Japan had conquered the island of Hainan and occupied French Indochina, were preparing to attack the Malaysian peninsula and Singapore, threatening the strategic Strait of Malacca. The Americans had none of that. In notes to General George Marshall, U.S. Delegate Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Deputy Chief of Staff of Military Intelligence, described “the concerted British pressure on us to engage in the Far East” and that a U.S. task force in Singapore “would be a strategic mistake of inestimable proportions.” The Americans recommended supporting support in the form of operations with the secondary aim of diverting Japanese forces from Singapore. The report of the 1941 U.S.-British Staff Conference established the concepts, resources, and strategies for general military deployment for a common Allied military strategy. The plan assumed that if the United States went to war with Germany, it would probably also go to war with Italy and Japan. .
The result of secret American-British-Canadian military talks in Washington, D.C., which took place from January to March 1941. The plan that Roosevelt had already made as part of the. The first strategic decision that dictated our course in this war was accepted by the washingtion secret in March 1941 between the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rear Admirals R.L. Ghormley and Richmond Kelly Turner and Captains Alan Kirk and DeWitt Ramsey represented the U.S. Navy. The decision that was taken there, summarized in the ABC-1 Staff Agreement of March 27, 1941, was as follows: if and when America enters the war, it will exercise “the main military effort of the United States” in the European theater. The U.S.-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Was a series of secret talks between members of the U.S. and British General Staffs on U.S.
military coordination in the event of U.S. entry into World War II. The conference was held in Washington, D.C. from January 29 to March 27, 1941, and ended with a report titled “ABC-1,” which was tacitly approved by President Franklin D. Roosevelt two days later. [1] At the end of January 1941, five high-ranking British officers arrived in Washington, D.C. Originally, the delegation was to be formally received. But isolationists, angry at President Franklin D. Roosevelt`s December 1940 speech on the “arsenal of democracy” and recently introduced lend-lease legislation, were vigilant against any activity that would confirm their suspicions that Roosevelt was pushing the United States into an alliance with Britain and a war against Germany. Instead, the reception was restricted and contained only a vague statement about the group`s arrival. This had to be the case, because the real tacit reason was the hot, red, blood-dripping flesh for the isolationists: “To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth with their present allies could defeat Germany and the allied powers with it if the United States were forced to resort to war.
The spirit behind this poster was still a year away when British and American officials set Allied war priorities. Library of Congress Morison, Samuel Eliot (1998) “Thoughts on Naval Strategy, World War II,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 51: No. 1, Article 7. Available from: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol51/iss1/7 From: ABC-1 Plan in The Oxford Companion to World War II” On the 27th. In March 1941, they presented their report. Under the name ABC-1 (American-British Conversations-1), it was a remarkable document of military cooperation between a neutral and a combatant, stating that “the high command of the United States and the United Kingdom will continually cooperate in the formulation and implementation of policies and strategic plans that will govern the war.” He recognized Europe as the main center of offensive operations, with the war against Japan being defensive until Germany and Italy were defeated. .